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I.

Introduction
Mishkin (1999) discussed four monetary policy regimes,

namely exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, inflation
targeting, and finally, “monetary policy with an implicit but not
an explicit nominal anchor.” Exchange rate targeting refers to a
monetary system that ties the domestic currency to some anchor
currency such as the US dollar.

An example would be the Hong

Kong dollar since October 17, 1983 and the Argentine peso before
it broke away from the US dollar link early 2002. Monetary
targeting refers to a policy of managing some monetary aggregate
such as M2 in an attempt to contain its growth within a target
range. As Mishkin pointed out, monetary targeting in practice
rarely followed a rigid rule as Friedman recommended in the
sixties. Adherents of this approach include Germany before the
European monetary union and Switzerland. Inflation targeting
is a monetary regime that has gained much popularity in recent
years.

Pioneered by New Zealand in 1990, it has now been

espoused by Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland,
Australia, and Spain. According to Mishkin, Israel and Chile
have also adopted some form of inflation targeting.

Finally,

monetary policy in the US under the leadership of Alan
Greenspan has adopted an eclectic approach.

There is no

explicit target of any sort. But the Fed would look at a range of
macroeconomic indicators in the conduct of monetary policy,
2

while making it clear to the public that containing inflation over
the long run remains always an overriding concern.
Of these four approaches, the first three can be said to be
predominantly “rule-based.”

In contrast, the last approach can

be said to be predominantly discretionary. 1

With no explicit

constraint, a central bank using this approach can respond to the
latest developments readily and giving due consideration for the
need for both full employment and price stability.

The success

of this policy in the US under the able chairmanship of Alan
Greenspan, however, has led to worries that should he step down
there might not be a chairman as skilled as he was.2
A meaningful discussion about monetary regimes must take
note of the distinction between means and ends. In this regard
Mishkin’s discussion of the pitfalls of monetary targeting is
particularly telling. Monetary aggregate targeting would make
1

Some see this eclectic monetary policy as more or less described by the
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). See Woodford (2001). Also see Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2003) for a more recent assessment.
2
Consider the following passage from a book review about Alan
Greenspan. The reviewer had just referred to the first interest rate cut
decline in 2 1/2 years, which happened at the peak of the global financial
crisis in the fall of 1998. He continued: “Just over a week later, he
surprised the markets by cutting interest rates again, this time ording a
reduction on his own instead of waiting for the next meeting of Fed’s
monetary policy committee. Investors cheered. Stock prices zoomed
higher. And the crisis passed. It’s thanks to that sort of astute monetary
management that the 74 year old Greenspan has achieved the status of an
economic oracle who holds the fate of the US economy in his hands….”
(Businessweek, December 18, 2000)
3

sense if there is a “strong and reliable relationship between the
goal variable (inflation or nominal income) and the targeted
aggregate,” and if the central bank can effectively control the
monetary aggregate. Here monetary targeting is seen to be the
means, and price stability is seen to be the ends. But one may
sensibly ask: why price stability?

Is price stability only the

means to something more intrinsically desirable?
It is illuminating to note with Mishkin that “despite the
rhetoric about pursuing ‘price stability,’ in practice all the
inflation targeting countries have chosen to target the inflation
rate rather than the level of prices per se.”

The inflation target

ranges from 1.5% in the case of New Zealand onward to 2.5% in
the case of Australia to 8.5% in the case of Israel.

Apparently,

the variations in the tolerated inflation rates reflect different
perceived costs in terms of lost GDP or lost jobs that could result
from pursuing inflation targeting. Thus, all policy makers in
practice try to avoid the recessionary impacts of an overly
aggressive monetary policy aimed at price stability.

Perhaps

then, inflation targeting is really only a variant of the
discretionary approach to monetary policy, whose objective after
all must be to create a favorable macroeconomic environment for
economic agents in their day-to-day activities.
Stabilizing the price level should not be an end in itself, as
changes in the price level may reflect an adjustment that the
4

economy actually needs.

For example, in the face of acute

shortage such as resulting from a serious drought or an earthquake
that disrupted economic activities, a jump in the price level3 may
be needed to encourage economizing on the scarce resources.

It

is not realistic to assume that any increase in prices in an
economy will be just offset by decreases in other prices, thus
maintaining price stability.
From this perspective, while price stability is desirable the
main objective of macroeconomic policy is not so much price
stability per se but sustainable full employment without
overheating.

In order to do this we need to achieve three

conditions: (1) aggregate demand at the full employment output
level, (2) fiscal budget balance at full employment, and (3)
monetary conditions should be compatible with full employment
budget balance.
Section II will lay out the theoretical framework laying out
the concepts of fiscal conditions index and monetary conditions
index and the principles behind fiscal and monetary policy
coordination. Section III will discuss the macroeconomic policy
rules under this framework for a bigger economy.

3

Section IV

It may be thought that in this instance only a relative increase in some
prices would take place, not a rise in the price level. In practice, however,
a major supply-side shock, such as the oil crises in the seventies, will raise
the price level, as a co-ordinated price decline for other goods and services
cannot be taken for granted.
5

will discuss the macroeconomic policy rules for a smaller
economy.

Finally Section VI will draw the conclusions from the

discussion.
II. Theoretical Framework
We start with the GDP as income identity:
GDP ≡ Yd +T-B
In words, GDP is identically equal to disposable incomes
plus net taxes minus government interest payment on government
debt.

When aggregate demand is in equilibrium, income must

be equal to expenditures, so we have:
Yd +T-B = C + I + G + X- M
This is the Keynesian cross condition for aggregate demand
equilibrium, which can be transposed to obtain:
T-G-B = I-S-(M-X).
This says Government Savings (GS) = Private Sector
Savings Deficiency (PD).
savings.

Any fiscal surplus is government

Any shortfall of private domestic savings (S) and

foreigners’ savings (M-X) to meet investment requirements is
Private Sector Savings Deficiency (GS).

Figure 1 shows how

the intersection of GS and PD determine the level of equilibrium
aggregate demand (AD) and the fiscal balance (BB).

6

Full employment
GDP

GS, PD

GS= T-G-B

BB
Y
AD
PD =I-S – (M-X)
Figure 1: Determination of Equilibrium Aggregate Demand (AD) and Budget
Balance (BB) Relative to Full Employment Output

T-G-B, or GS by notation, can be written as a function of
effective tax rate, lumpsum tax, government expenditures, and the
GDP Y. Setting GS = 0, we can write Y as a function g(t, t0, G),
with the following properties:
g’1< 0 , g’2 < 0, and g’3 > 0
g can be called a fiscal conditions index. When g is equal
to the full employment GDP, we will have GS* in Figure 2.
This will be described as the “full employment budget balance
fiscal conditions line.” Given the tax structure and interest
payment commitments, there is a unique level of government
expenditures G that will bring about GS*, which is one in a map
of “fiscal stance lines.”

7

Yf

GS

T- G –B

g<Yf

g=Yf
Y
g >Yf

Figure 2: Relationship between GS lines and Fiscal
Conditions g

We should note that GS* is not unique because one can have
higher taxes and higher government expenditures, or smaller taxes
and smaller government expenditures, while keeping the full
employment budget balance to 0. That is, a fiscal policy line
intersecting the horizontal axis at the full employment level can
be compatible with a bigger or a smaller government.
Figure 3 further shows that there is a unique position of the
I-S-(M-X) line that will bring about a level of aggregate demand
consistent with full employment.

To see this, let us express the

private savings gap PD as a function of r, e, Y, t, and t0:
8

PD = I(r,e) – [Y- Y.t - t0 – C(Y – Y.t – t0, W)] + X(e)– M(r, e) .
Here consumption is assumed to be a function of disposable
income and assets W.

Exogenous factors such as the GDP of

trading partners are left out for simplicity. Setting PD = 0, we
can write Y as a function m( r, e, t, t0, W).

Diagramatically,

setting PD=0 focuses our attention on the horizontal axis. The
value of m is the level of Y where a PD line cuts the horizontal
axis.

m can be described as the monetary conditions index.4

When m increases monetary conditions are effectively less tight.
When m decreases monetary conditions tighten.
described

as

conditions”.

the

“full

employment–compatible

m* can be
monetary

It should be noted that the monetary conditions

index will rise, other things being equal, when interest rate falls or
the exchange rate depreciates.

But it may also rise or fall

independently of monetary variables.

If business confidence or

consumer confidence increases the same monetary variables could
become overly expansionary, since the former would boost the
monetary conditions index. Moreover, fiscal variables such as
tax rates will also have an impact on the effective monetary

4

The concept of Monetary Conditions Index was originated by the Bank
of Canada. According to Freedman (1995) empirically 1 percentage point
change in interest rates has about the same effect on aggregate demand as 3
per cent change in the exchange rate. The MCI is therefore an index
based on short-term interest rate and the multilateral exchange rate
movements properly weighted.
9

conditions by shifting PD through its effects on savings and
investment.
Yf

PD
I – S – (M –X)

m*=Yf

m >Yf

Y
m <Yf
PD*
Figure 3: Relationship between PD lines and
Monetary Conditions m

III. Policy Rules
For both big and small economies, the above framework
indicates that an ideal macroeconomic policy mix would be such
as depicted in Figure 4.

There is a need to maintain the fiscal

policy conditions at g* and to maintain the monetary conditions at
m*.

Once the parameters for the equations g and m are

estimated, we can compare the actual level of fiscal conditions
index g with the ideal g* and similarly the actual level of
monetary conditions index m with the ideal m* and decide if we
need to expand or tighten policies.

10

GS, PD

Yf

GS* = T-G-B

Y

PD*=I-S+X-M

Figure 4: Ideal Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Represented by
Solid GS* and PD* lines

The fiscal policy rule can be described as maintaining full
employment budget balance.

Monetary policy will generally not

affect the GS line, except in the longer run through the effects on
interest payments on government debt.
Assuming a stable fiscal policy regime, PD may deviate
from PD* on account of changes in business and consumption
sentiments, or movements in the effective real exchange rate.
The monetary policy rule would be to raise or lower interest rates
to offset these tendencies so as to bring PD back to PD* whenever
PD deviates from it.

11

Corresponding to m =Yf or PD = PD* we can draw an M*
curve in the ( e, r ) space (Figure 5).

M* is one curve in a

family of “monetary conditions curves” shaped like an
indifference curve. The equilibrium exchange rate compatible
with full employment is determined by imposing the equilibrium
condition in the foreign exchange market D=S.
Given M*, suppose there is a capital flight away from the
country for some reason.

D=S line shifts up.

There will be no

need to change fiscal policy, and M* has not moved.

But there

will be a need to reduce the effective exchange rate to e* and to
raise domestic interest rates from r1 to r*. Raising interest rates
excessively to r2 to maintain external balance will lead to an
unnecessary contraction of the economy resulting in a fiscal
deficit and unemployment.
Given the position of M* and assuming that fiscal policy
provides for full employment budget balance, and assuming that
maintaining full employment is a priority, the central bank will
have no alternative under a capital flight scenario (E1 changes to
E2 in Figure 5) but to allow the currency to depreciate a bit and to
raise interest rates a bit (point 3 in Figure 5). The more serious
the capital flight, the greater will be the depreciation required and
the higher will be the interest rates required.
must not be too high as to deviate from M*.
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But interest rates

rd

D=S[E=E2]

r2

2

D=S[E=E1]

3

r*

1

r1

M*

e*

e1

Effective Exchange Rate
Index for Domestic
Currency

Figure 5: Alternative (e,r) combinations compatible with
full employment along M*

IV. Policy Rules for a Small Open Economy
A small open economy has relatively little capacity on fixing
its interest rates.

With capital highly mobile small open

economies normally have to take interest rates as given.
Floating the exchange rate and adopting discretionary monetary
policy may lead to unacceptably large fluctuations in exchange
rates, as market traders speculate on the next monetary policy
change.

13

The attraction of a currency board arrangement is that it
imposes a stricter rule for monetary and fiscal discipline and
provides greater transparency than most alternative monetary
arrangements that come to mind.

The drawback of a traditional

currency board, however, is that it could mean too much
inflexibility.

If the host currency becomes very strong, life can

become very difficult as the country will face a loss of
competitiveness and even deflationary pressures.

Using the

GS-PD framework above, a traditional currency board would
mean allowing the PD line to be dictated by the monetary policy
of the country of the host currency.
To bring in greater flexibility without compromising
credibility, we propose substituting the host currency with the
“world currency unit”—an indexed unit of account 5 that
represents stable real purchasing power, as discussed in Ho (2000).
This can be briefly explained as follows.
Let Qi0 be the GDP of country/zone i in base year 0,
measured in the domestic currency.

We then define the WCU

basket as a tiny fraction λ of the basket of GDPs of five major
market economies with fully convertible currencies:
1

WCU0 = λ{ Q10 ,Q20 ,Q30 , Q40, Q50 }

5

[1]

See McCallum (2004) and Shiller (1998) for detailed discussions of the
concept of indexed units of account.
14

The five countries/zones are the United States, the Euro zone,
Japan, Canada, and Australia. Together they encompass some
80 per cent of world total output.
Valuation of this basket in the base year, V0US$0 , is obtained
by defining λ such that:
λ∑ Qi0 . e i0 = US$ 100
where

[2]

λ is a scaling factor that defines the size of the

basket and thus the real value of the unit;
i is any of the five major economies;
e i0 is the exchange rate converting 1 unit of the currency of i
into US$ in year 0.
Valuation over time reflects the forces of exchange rate
movements as well as domestic inflation/deflation. Denoting the
nominal value of one WCU0 at t in US dollars as V0US$t, we can
write:
V0US$t = λ∑ Qi0 . Pit/Pi0 .e it.
If Qi0 in current domestic prices increases because of
inflation, and/or if currency i appreciates against the US dollar,
other things being equal, the nominal value of the WCU basket in
US dollars will increase, but still represents the same command
over real goods.
15

Figure 6 shows the changes in the nominal value of one
WCU1990US$t, computed using IMF and OECD statistics, from
1983 to 1999. A caveat must be added though. In revaluing
the WCU basket, we use the consumer price indices of the
different countries/zones, even though in principle GDP deflators
would have been more appropriate.

We do this because the GDP

deflators are usually available only after a relatively long lag.
Since the WCU is intended to be a unit of account ready to be
used on a day-to-day basis, for practical reasons CPIs have to be
used instead of GDP deflators in deriving the current values of the
unit.

Exchange rate: US$ per W CU (base year: 1990)

140
130
120

US$

110
100
90
80
70
60
50
Q1 83 Q1 85 Q1 87 Q1 89 Q1 91 Q1 93 Q1 95 Q1 97 Q1 99
period

Figure 6: Value of the WCU with base year 1990 in U.S $ 1983-1999
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Whereas under a traditional currency board, such as the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, there is an undertaking to
convert these Hong Kong dollar notes back to US dollars at the
same rate, under a WCU-based link, convertibility is guaranteed
not at a fixed rate against the US dollar, but at a fixed rate in
terms of real purchasing power (“real money,” not “nominal
money”).

This means that the US dollar amount into which a

given amount of the local currency may be converted is variable.
Indeed, if US dollar buys fewer goods and services, the local
currency will convert for more US dollars; if US dollars buys
more goods and services, the local currency will convert for less
US dollars.
Specifically, the Monetary Authority may announce at time
τthat ατ times V0US$τ must be deposited for banks to issue one
unit of the local currency (called peso here for illustrative
purposes), until further notice.

Clearly, by adopting a suitable

ατ the local currency can fix the value of the domestic currency
at any rate in relation to the US dollar, and any traditional
currency board, such as the Hong Kong dollar6, can, therefore,
momentarily move onto the WCU link unnoticeably and
smoothly.
6

One could debate if the Hong Kong dollar is on a “traditional currency
board” arrangement. We abstract from this debate and refer to all
currencies linked to a host currency with 100% backing as “traditional
currency boards.”
17

-

These pesos are then called pesos of vintageτ. The
monetary authority undertakes that these pesos issued
are fully convertible into ατ times V0US$t at any time t,
redeemable in US dollars (or any other major currency
according to prevailing exchange rates).

-

At some time tk in the future, if there is a need to
devalue, such as arising from a downward shift in PD (in
which case M* shifts lower), or a capital flight (in which
case there is a deviation from M* such as described in
Figure 5), the monetary authority can announce a
devaluation in the sense of a downward adjustment in α.
This devaluation will not trigger a panic as existing
currency holders are protected.

So we can see that the fiscal policy rule is still to maintain
GS at GS* and thus to keep fiscal conditions at g*.
monetary policy rule is also to maintain PD at PD*.

The

The benefit

of the proposed arrangement is that PD will not be shifted by a
nominal appreciation or depreciation of the host currency.

When

there is some structural change that needs to be redressed and a
real appreciation or depreciation is called for, we can adjust α
without causing a panic.
The proposed monetary standard can be called a Real
Monetary Unit Standard (RMUS).

Transition to a RMUS can be

made so smooth as to be unnoticeable.
18

A country on moving to

a WCU0 link will determine α such that α.Vt = 1 unit of the
domestic currency.

Thus someαcan be found such that 7.8

Hong Kong dollars continue to exchange for one US dollar
momentarily after the transition, when 7.8 Hong Kong dollars
exchange for one US dollar before the transition.
A further word about sustainability should be added. It is
that a currency regime, in order to be sustainable, needs to be
adaptable and compatible with full employment.

If the currency

regime produces an exchange rate that is not compatible with full
employment and has no effective mechanism to adapt towards
such a rate it cannot be sustainable.

In contrast, the system

herein proposed allows adaptation towards what is necessary to
bring about full employment.
One may well ask if this system is sustainable in the face of
shattered confidence.

Given the Argentine experience in

2001-2002 and the Asian experience in 1997-98, it does appear
that if people firmly believe that the currency will collapse,
nothing can be done.

If we look at the Thai and the Indonesian

experience carefully, however, we can only conclude that the
collapse of confidence was a result of ineffective and misguided
policies in the first place.

Even in the case of Argentina, high

interest rates and a lack of the necessary institutions to protect the
interest of people who have legitimate claims to be protected
played a key role in the melt down of the economy.
19

If we look at the Thai experience, we find first that the
financial markets actually cheered the initial devaluation of the
Thai baht.

The Thai stock market jumped noticeably at first.

But when interest rates were raised sharply higher around the
region (The Philippine central bank raises the overnight lending
rate to 24 percent from 15 percent on July 3, 1997) and the
austerity measures announced on August 5 impressed upon
investors that the region is headed for a dramatic economic
slowdown confidence began to crumble.
Under the proposal of a WCU link, full employment and
economic stability are the explicit objectives of the central bank,
and no attempt is made to defend an unrealistically high exchange
rate.

Interest rates will not be raised to defend the currency and

will only be raised to cool the economy.

Holders of the

domestic currency as well as bank deposits know that while the
currency may devalue, their interests will be protected as the
vintage of their assets are specified and fully recognized.

The

valuation of the currency will not be allowed to take on unrealistic
values in the first place, unlike what may happen under a nominal
tie to the US dollar. For all these reasons, and for the reason that
the WCU itself represents purchasing power over a diversified
portfolio of multiple currency denominated output, risks for
holding the local currency and assets of the local currency are
reduced considerably.

Because perceived risks are smaller, a

collapse of confidence is less likely.
20

The WCU should be a globally used unit of account in order
to serve its purpose.

In order that the unit be accepted as a

standard, it will be necessary for an international organization,
such as the IMF, to take the lead and to set the standard.
Clearly there is no reason why the GDPs of other countries cannot
be added to the basket of GDPs underlying the WCU.

I would

expect, for example, that China’s GDP may be included some day.
The key points are that the currencies of the countries represented
in the basket must be fully convertible and that the countries are
predominantly free market economies, so that the prices of these
countries are true market prices.

Once the basket of GDPs are

chosen, the revaluation of the WCU unit can be taken over by a
computer using a transparent formula.

It is expected that the

composition of the basket may need to be updated at some point.
When this becomes necessary continuity of the series can be
maintained by reconciling the valuation in the last period under
the old basket and the valuation in the first period under the new
basket.

This procedure is routinely done with regard to the

consumer price index and should be both transparent and
automatic.
While the definition of the WCU0 needs to be done with
authority by an international organization and the revaluation
automatically updated continuously as data becomes available,
the monetary policy of countries opting for a WCU0 link should

21

be entirely independent. Each central bank should choose an
appropriate α and make appropriate adjustments as necessary.
V.

Dynamics
It is not the intention of this paper to investigate the dynamic

properties of this framework, but I need to point out that while the
framework may be thought to be static in nature, there are
interesting dynamics involved.
First is income-expenditure dynamics. As is well known,
while the Keynesian cross diagram appears static, the multiplier is
actually a dynamic process. Our discussion of GS-PD is only an
alternative representation of the familiar Keynesian cross
relationship and requires exactly the same conditions for stability
in the income-expenditure dynamics, i.e., the marginal propensity
to spend on domestic goods has to be smaller than unity.
Second is debt accumulation dynamics. Debt at the end of
the year has to be equal to debt at the beginning of the year plus
any deficit generated during the year. Thus the time path of
government debt is governed by the relation:
(Gt,t+1 + Bt,t+1 – Tt,t+1 ) + Dt = Dt+1
which can be detailed further by spelling out Bt,t+1 = B(Dt, rh), i.e.,
the interest payment on government debt in the period from t to

22

t+1 is a function of the amount of outstanding debt at time t, and
the historical interest rates rh at which the debt was issued.
In the foreign exchange market, we have:
∂e
=
∂t

f (X – M, rd – rf)

which says that the exchange rate change is a function of the
current account surplus and the difference between domestic and
foreign interest rates. f1 and f2 are both positive.
Finally, it is acknowledged that the discussion thus far has
ignore price level change dynamics resulting from the interaction
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply.

If aggregate

demand exceeds or falls short of aggregate supply, the price level
may change and this may lead to changes in the foreign exchange
market as well as secondary effects on both PD and GS. These
considerations will complicate the model but will not affect the
general conclusions about the appropriateness of setting PD at
PD* and GS at GS* as illustrated in Figure 4.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper I have proposed a simple framework that is
based on the simple Keynesian cross condition for aggregate
demand determination.

Two measures for macroeconomic

policies have been derived: a fiscal conditions index and a
monetary conditions index. We have proposed an inactive fiscal
23

policy: keeping fiscal conditions at g* and the GS curve at the
GS* position regardless of the phase of the business cycle, along
with a more active monetary policy aimed at reestablishing m at
m* whenever it deviates from it for whatever reasons.

While the

analytical framework can be said to be Keynesian this policy
recommendation is certainly not Keynesian.
While I made a case for keeping monetary conditions at the
full employment compatible level, in practice this would dictate
moving both interest rate and exchange rates at times for the
bigger economies.

For the smaller economies, I propose

adopting an innovative currency board based on an indexed unit
of account representing constant purchasing power.

Such a

currency board is shown to have built-in flexibility compared to
traditional currency boards.

Our analytical framework indicates

that even with such built-in flexibility, it is possible that an
occasional devaluation or revaluation may be necessary.

By

designating currency issues and bank deposits with a vintage α
and guaranteeing convertibility into the basket of constant
purchasing power at the given rate, it is possible to avoid panic,
and provide for smooth transition to the necessary monetary
conditions required for full employment.

24
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